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National Trends in Court Review of Agency Action:
Some Reflections on the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act and New Utah Administrative
Procedure Act*
Dave Frohnmayer**
l.

INTRODUCTION

The new Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") 1 sets
forth important statutory directives governing state agency actions. One
of the UAPA's principal drafters asserts that the judicial review provisions may be the act's "most important contribution to the certainty of
the law in Utah .... " 2
The agency adjudication and judicial review provisions of the
Utah act were developed in large part from the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act ("MSAPA") 3 • Some features of the UAPA,
however, depart from the provisions of the MSAPA. 4 This can be explained by current trends in Utah administrative practice. Yet larger
national controversies and trends in administrative law influenced development of the MSAPA from which the Utah act proceeds generally.
Those trends have developed in a national context marked by continuing interest in "regulatory reform" 11 and amidst criticisms of administrative "malaise." Thus, the forthcoming Utah experience is ripe with
potential national significance. Will the act fulfill its promise in bring• These comments were presented at the Western States Seminar on State and Local
Administrative Law, sponsored by the BYU Journal of Public Law, on January 21, 1988.
•• Attorney General, State of Oregon; State Representative, Oregon Legislative Assembly,
1975-81; Professor of Law, University of Oregon, 1971-80; A.B. Harvard University, 1962; B.A.
1964; M.A. Oxford University, 1971; J.D. University of California, Berkeley, 1967.
1. UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 63-46a-1 to 63-46b-22 (Supp. 1988).
2. A. SULLIVAN, OVERVIEW OF THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 5 (Code
Co. 1987).
3. MoDEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE AcT (1981), 14 U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 1988) [hereinafter
MSAPA (1981)].
4. 14 U.L.A. 70 (Supp. 1981). The UAPA rulemaking provisions were separately considered
and enacted. They depart in major respects from the MSAPA. See infra text accompanying notes
51-52.
5. See generally Davis, Deregulation and Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 67
(1988); Frohnmayer, Regulatory Reform: A Slogan in Search of Substance, 66 A.B.A. J. 871
(1980); Special Project on State Regulatory Reform, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 249.
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ing clarity and certainty to a body of developed state administrative
law? Or will it instead become another relic of failed administrative
law experimentation, destined only for some dusty museum of legal
antiquities ?6
The enactment of a new Utah law, the continuing scholarly debate
over the proper functions and scope of judicial review ,7 and the renewal
of judicial attention to administrative law in many state jurisdictions8
all coincide to make state administrative law developments a timely
topic to revisit. This article examines a number of recent trends in state
administrative law. While examining these trends the article canvases
and analyzes some principal judicial review provisions of the MSAPA
and UAPA. Finally, the article concludes by suggesting briefly the potential for further generations of state administrative law reform which
build on the Utah experience.

II.

TRENDS IN STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

The extensive development of state administrative law in a typical
American jurisdiction has been chronicled elsewhere. 9 Building upon
these studies, it is now possible to identify a number of emergent trends
in state administrative practice. These trends underscore the often undervalued importance of state law 10 as a critical area for study and
innovation. 11
6. "[T]o be blunt, the history of American administrative law is a history of failed ideas." J.
Mashaw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 1 (1983).
7. See generally Levin, Scope of Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section
Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 239 (1986).
8. See, e.g., A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING (1986); Bonfield, State
Law In the Teaching of Administrative Law: A Critical Analysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L.
REV. 95 (1982).
9. See generally Frohnmayer, The Oregon Administrative Procedure Act: An Essay on State
Administrative Rulemaking Procedure Reform, 58 OR. L. REv. 411 (1980). Parochialism or convenience aside, Oregon serves as a useful example of a typical American state jurisdiction. The
state APA, OR. REV. STAT. § 183.310 (1987), both follows and expands upon earlier model acts.
The bar is informed and guided by sophisticated practitioners and legal scholars. See, e.g., OREGON STATE BAR, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (A. Johnson ed. 1986). The appellate courts are
well grounded in administrative practice and have contributed opinions of national note. See, e.g.,
Megdal v. Oregon Bd. of Dental Examiners, 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980); Fasano v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Oregon
Liquor Control Comm'n., 16 Or. App. 63, 517 P.2d 289 (1973). Finally, there is a wealth of
commentary and analysis in readily accessible form. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL's MoDEL
RULES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND MANUAL (1985); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, PAPERS (1985, 1987).
10. See generally BoNFIELD, supra note 8.
11. Federal law occasionally exhibits substantial judicial innovation which is often halted by
the United States Supreme Court. Yet except for minor provisions relating to ex parte contacts,
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act has remained essentially unchanged since 1946. The
experience in the states with new innovations has been vastly more active.
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Legal trends are not always examples of judicial creativity. Court
decisions may exemplify trends without assuming responsibility for
their genesis. In public law, courts follow legislatures and administrative agencies as much as they lead them; and the interaction among the
three branches of government has posed questions which will require
answers in the equations of new models of judicial analysis. This article, as a consequence, will focus not merely on standards by which
courts review administrative action, but will also examine trends generated by legislation or by litigation outcomes in state administrative law
as well. In short, the focus is on what is reviewed as well as how it is
reviewed.

A. Trend 1: State jurisdictions Have Enacted And Have
Increasingly Applied Formal Laws Governing Administrative
Procedure
Lawyers often give too much attention to case law and consequently, only passing attention to statutes. This failing accounts for the
resistance which many statutory reforms of administrative procedure
have repeatedly faced, even in the recent past.
Recently, state common law concerning administrative process has
yielded to statutory enactments and the methodologies of statutory analysis. Citizens who deal with their governments now must utilize the
concepts and procedures of state administrative statutes. A significant
majority of states presently subscribe to some variant of the 1961 Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act ("RMSAPA") and its
progeny. 12 More importantly, state appellate courts increasingly apply
the literal terms of these enactments to govern and change state agency
behavior/ 8 as well as to heighten the awareness of that jurisdiction's
practicing bar.
Sensitivity to administrative law formalities translates immediately
into a series of essential, yet elementary admonitions to the legal practitioner. Accusations of administrative law malpractice, accompanied by
the twin perils of insurance premium increases and blemishes on professional reputation, can be easily avoided. Attorneys who challenge the
12. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE AcT (1961), 14 U.L.A. 157 (Supp. 1988)
[Hereinafter RMSAPA]. The 1988 Supplement to the UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED lists thirty
jurisdictions in which portions of the jurisdictions' administrative procedure acts can be traced to
earlier model acts. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (1961), 14 U.L.A. 157
(Supp. 1988) [hereinafter RMSAPA (1961)].
13. State agencies are often the slowest to grasp that procedural statutes are meant to modify
official behavior, not just to act as a reservoir of remedies for citizens once the agency has ignored
the law. See, e.g., De St. Germain v. Employment Div., 74 Or. App. 484, 703 P.2d 986 (1985)
("[A] judicial version of the primal scream" at agency misbehavior).
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actions of public bodies on behalf of their clients should address the
following considerations:
1. Does the government act in question proceed from an affirmative grant of constitutional or statutorily delegated authority?
Simply put, does the state constitution, a state statute, a validly
promulgated administrative rule, a local government charter or a
local ordinance even permit the questioned action to occur?
2. Were all required procedural steps by state or local administrative procedure acts or ordinances faithfully observed? If not,
what specific recourse is available to challenge such law
violations?
3. Does the state or local law require the governmental entity
in question to justify its decision, in writing, and with specific
reasons?
4. Is the judgment or decision of the governmental entity in
question subject to review in some other political, quasi-judicial or
judicial forum? If so, what legal standards and what factual evidence, if any, are relevant to, or govern that review?
5. Is there an available avenue through which it may be
cheaper, faster or more appropriate to change the law rather than
to challenge it?
These obvious inquiries are the daily grist for the mill of an administrative lawyer. The correct answers usually flow from precisely
considered statutory sources. Yet citizens and legal counsel unaccustomed to the practice of public law at the state and local level have,
until recently, ignored these avenues at their peril, and to the impoverishment of public law.

B. Trend 2: judicial Enforcement of Procedural Formalities
Increasingly Exceeds Minimum Compliance, and in Some Cases
Even Extends Beyond the Literal Provisions of Governing Statutes
1.

Agency rulemaking generally

a. Federal developments: A backdrop and contrast. Observers of
federal administrative law developments have remarked upon the embellishment of statutory formalism developed by certain federal circuits.14 Yet in two noted cases, the United States Supreme Court has
rebuffed efforts by the federal courts to impose administrative proce14. See, e.g., Rodway v. Department of Agric., 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (agency record required even in informal rulemaking); Wright, New judicial Requisites for Informal
Rulemaking: Implications for the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 29 ADMIN. L. REv.
59 (1977).
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dure requirements more onerous for the agency than those of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
In United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 111 the United
States Supreme Court rejected the lower court's conclusion that the
"hearing" requirement of section 1(14 )(a) of the Interstate Commerce
Act by itself triggered the formal rulernaking provisions of the federal
APA. The Court's conclusion was in keeping with considerable scholarly criticism of trial-type rulernaking procedure/ 6 and with the Administrative Conference of the United States, which opposed trial type
procedures with the thrust of one of its important recornrnendations. 17
The message of Florida East Coast Railway, however, apparently
was received with indifference. Consequently, the most telling blow to
the expanding judicial creativity in devising agency procedure was not
authoritatively struck until 1978. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, 18 the Supreme Court "authoritatively convicted" the
"imperial judiciary [of] riding roughshod over the agencies .... " 19 The
Supreme Court seems to have read the federal APA to preclude judicial
insistence on "hybrid" hearing requirements beyond those expressly
and literally imposed by statute. At least some lower federal court
judges have not accepted the verdict happily. For example, former Congressman, now Circuit Judge Abner Mikva, recently levelled a broadside blow of his own at the Vermont Yankee opinion, stating: "I cannot
think of any other decision that has done more to bollix up administrative law in the past decade. The Court tried to clean up a whole area of
regulatory doctrine, and it succeeded only in making the mess worse." 20
Of course, the United States Supreme Court cannot alone stern the
tide of growing formalization of the federal agency rulernaking process.
This is especially true since Congress itself often has prescribed additional standards for the rulernaking process going beyond the minimum
"notice and comment" requirements of section 553 of the Federal APA.
When Congress has spoken, no court is free to bless agency evasion of
additional standards, 21 even when those standards contribute to the loss
of procedural uniformity in federal agency practice. 22
15. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
16. See, e.g., Hamilton, Procedures for Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The
Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276 (1972).
17. Recommendation No. 72-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.72-5 (1975).
18. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
19. Starr, judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L.
REV. 353, 369 (1987).
20. Mikva, The Changing Role of judicial Review, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 115, 122 (1986).
21. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(19)
(statutorily provided right of cross-examination on disputed factual issues).
22. Variances between the Federal APA's minimum "notice and comment" requirements and
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b. State law developments. State jurisprudence on agency
rulemaking largely has by-passed both the heated rhetoric of federal
courts and the analytical battles of scholars fought at the federal level
over the "hard look" doctrine 23 (a detailed factual review of the agency
action) and its variants. Yet there are signs that many of the conflicting
currents of federal administrative law also find analogues in state administrative law developments.
Many of the theoretical values of the administrative process-speed, efficiency, superior expertise and flexibility-can be lost if
the quasi-legislative process is fossilized by excessive overlays of required procedure. Yet those same values remain unfulfilled if, in the
pursuit of efficiency and expertise, the agency is allowed lawlessly to
ignore its legislatively imposed mandate. Some commentators obviously
believe that detailed factual review of the agency action by courts is the
only disciplinary mechanism that effectively will insure agency fidelity
to law. 24
These tensions in the premises of modern administrative law are
not easily resolved; in fact they reflect conflicts in fundamental values.
As a matter of separation of powers principles, legislatures, courts and
agencies often dispute their respective claims to government turf. But
this debate is not simply an otherwise value-neutral discourse about
how best to implement constitutional commands by allocating duties to
government institutions. Citizens and interest groups have high stakes
in ultimate political outcomes, not just in the choice of process for its
own sake. Court decisions reflect ideological commitments as well as
views of the appropriate formality of administrative and judicial
processes. Finally, scholars and courts stake out positions on these legal
issues based on often unarticulated values concerning the appropriate
functions of administrative procedures generally. 211

specific statutory requirements are so significant that one court complained overtly that Congress
made "a conscious effort never to use the same phraseology twice." Associated Indus. of New York
v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 345 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973).
23. The phrase is that of Judge Leventhal. See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking
and the Role of the Court, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974). For further analysis, see Sunstein, In
Defense of the Hard Look: judicial Activism and Administrative Law, 7 HARV. ]. L. & Pus.
Pm.'v 51 (1984); Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 177.
24. See, e.g., Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L. ]. 38, 5960 (1975).
25. See generally Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 393 (1981); Frohnmayer, supra note 9, at 459-62.
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State agency rulemaking

a. Compliance with minimum procedural requirements. State
court decisions now insist almost uniformly that agencies comply with
literal statutory requirements respecting the promulgation, amendment
or repeal of agency rules. Agencies cannot evade observance of these
formalities, for example, by ignoring the definition sections of the administrative procedure acts. If an agency policy declaration fits the definition of "rule," the action is judged by its functional effect, not by the
agency's label. 28 No semantic manipulation describing the act as a
"guideline," 27 a "handbook," 28 or an "internal management directive,"29 properly suffices to evade rulemaking procedural requirements.
Similarly, repeal of a rule usually constitutes rulemaking under state
acts, and likewise, literal compliance with formalities is enforced. 30
Agencies also may be tempted to evade rulemaking formalities, whether
due to impatience with bureaucratic delay or a more contemptible desire to evade occasions for available public comment by using emergency or temporary rulemaking procedures. However, both legislative
changes 31 and court decisions 32 have rendered this avenue a less likely
escape from required legal procedures.
b. Formal rulemaking in the states. The thrust of the MSAPA is
to avoid excessive procedural formality. Yet its provisions may require
delay, expense and interruption beyond the contemplation of its authors. Utah has chosen consciously to avoid several potential pitfalls of
the 1981 MSAP A as well as those exemplified by federal developments.
This section explores, briefly, the alternatives which are presented.
For the most part, state administrative procedure acts have not
mimicked the formal rulemaking requirements of their federal APA
counterpart. 33 Consequently, the trial-type model of rulemaking and
related issues concerning "hybrid" procedures have not been markedly
26. Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986). See generally Lane v.
Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 727 P.2d 206 (Utah 1986); see, e.g., Chesire Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Commission on Hosp. and Health Care, 34 Conn. Supp. 255, 386 A.2d 264
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1977). The Utah Supreme Court has followed these trends.
27. See, e.g., Lehman v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of New York, 82 A.D.2d 832,
439 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
28. See, e.g., Clark v. Public Welfare Div., 27 Or. App. 473, 556 P.2d 722 (1976); Will v.
Department of Health and Social Serv., 44 Wis. 2d 507, 171 N.W.2d 378 (1969).
29. See, e.g., Grey Panthers v. Public Welfare Div., 28 Or. App. 841, 561 P.2d 674 (1977);
Schinzel v. Department of Corrections, 124 Mich. App. 217, 333 N.W.2d 519 (1983).
30. See, e.g., Rivas v. Board of Cosmetologists, 101 N.M. 592, 686 P.2d 934 (1984).
31. E.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 183.335(5)(a) (1971) (specific findings required).
32. American Grain Prods. Processing lnst. v. Department of Pub. Health, 392 Mass. 309,
467 N.E.2d 455 (1984).
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556, 557 (1982).
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evident in state administrative jurisprudence. Unlike the federal APA,
state acts often include interpretive rules 3 • within the ambit of
rulemaking requirements. Broad federal exemptions, such as those for
policies concerning public property, grants, loans and contracts35 often
are not carried into state laws. 36 The river of procedural requirements
flows more broadly in the states, but it does not cut so deeply.
These observations briefly canvass the differences in the range of
agency actions subject to APA coverage. Other state developments suggest that the formality evident at the federal level has some state analogues. The Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, for example, imposes significant trial-type requirements on agency rulemaking. 37 The
burdens are so onerous that a leading scholar has condemned them as
unwieldy and counterproductive. 36 The Minnesota experience should
not be replicated by other states.

3.

The agency "statement of need"

Requirements short of a trial-type hearing might, over time, lead
to the evolution of "hybrid" procedures in state jurisdictions. In Oregon, for example, the state APA requires the initial notice of rulemaking to be accompanied by a public articulation of the agency's specific
legal authority, and by a "statement of need" for the rule, as well as a
justification as to how the proposed rule meets the articulated need. 39
This public notice device, however, simply requires a description of the
agency's means-ends reasoning. This statutory obligation is far less onerous than the process of limiting the content of rules to considerations
formally introduced into an exclusive rulemaking hearing "record."
The reasons are obvious. An expanded notice requirement is simply a
matter of public information. It does not engage the expansive and
time-consuming procedural machinery of formal hearings.
The Oregon approach may recommend itself to other jurisdictions.
It does not provide for (and, in fact explicitly disclaims) any evidentiary
record in rulemaking! 0 The required provision of the agency's ration34. Cf Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the APA, 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 101
(1971).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1982).
36. But see, Caldwell v. Amoco Fabrics Co., 165 Ga. App. 674, 302 S.E.2d 596 (1983)
(Georgia statute exempts policies relating to state or agency benefits).
37. MINN. STAT. §§ 15.04-.41 (1977).
38. See generally Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63 MINN. L. REv.
151 (1979).
39. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 183.335(2)(b)(B-C) (1971).
40. /d. at § 183.335(12).

1]

UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

9

ale for a proposed rule comes at the very initiation of the process. This
procedural device maximizes the possibility for public notice, legislative
review and political reaction to the proposal before the agency ever
takes final rulemaking action.'u

4. Required "reasons" in agency rulemaking: an analysis and
critique
State courts have significantly reinforced the language of the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1961. The 1961 Act
requires an agency to issue a "concise statement of the principal reasons for and against [a rule's] adoption, incorporating therein its reasons for overruling the considerations urged against its adoption."' 2
Even absent a statute directing the articulation of reasons, in Tri-State
Generation and Transmission Association v. Environmental Quality
Council, 43 the Wyoming Supreme Court enforced a requirement that
an agency must develop a statement justifying the agency's rulemaking
decision, and held the agency to the contents of that statement to insure
that judicial review of the process could be pursued meaningfully.
The Uniform Law Commissioner's Model State Administrative
Procedure Act of 1981 modifies commonly understood agency rulemaking requirements.•• In at least one respect, however, the MSAPA imposes ill-advised conditions. Section 3-110(b) of the Act specifically imposes a "reasons" requirement by providing that "[o]nly the reasons
contained in the concise explanatory statement may be used by any
party as justifications for the adoption of the rule in any proceeding in
which its validity is at issue." 411 The official comment to this section
justifies this restriction by castigating the evils of post-hoc agency rationalizations for action. 48 It argues that later-ascribed reasons would be
unfairly withheld from scrutiny in the open rulemaking process itself.
Finally, the comment contends that administrative agencies should not
be protected from failure to consider, prior to the time of decisionmaking, all relevant defensible reasons for a choice. 47
41. See generally Frohnmayer, supra note 9, 455-67.
42. RMSAPA (1961) § 3(a)(2), 14 U.L.A. 387 (1987).
43. 590 P.2d 1324 (Wyo. 1979).
44. See MSAPA ( 1981) § 3-110, comment, 14 U .L.A. 97-98 (Supp. 1988). The revision
sensibly no longer requires the agency to engage in line-by-line rebuttal of policy positions not
adopted by it. In a proceeding attracting any volume of responses, prolonging debate over the
many roads not taken could readily generate wasteful diversions of time, tax dollars and scarce
expertise.
45. MSAPA (1981) § 3-110(b), 14 U.L.A. 97 (Supp. 1988).
46. See supra note 44, at 97-98.
47. /d.
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Notwithstanding the carefully considered reasoning of the Commissioners on Uniform Laws, adoption of subsection 3-llO(b) could
work substantial mischief. The benefits suggested by the Commissioners do not outweigh the likely adverse realities of implementation on
practice. 48
First, it is not easy to see precisely how any articulated agency
"reasons" can bear on the fundamental legal validity of a quasi-legislative rule. The grounds for invalidating agency action under the
MSAPA are specified in section 5-116,49 which deals with scope of
judicial review. In the ordinary case, a rule should survive attack if the
agency's action complies with rulemaking procedure, is within the
agency's statutorily delegated discretion, and is otherwise constitutional.
It is difficult to envision how the agency's articulated reasons for a discretionary policy choice routinely would bear on these exclusively legal
questions. The legality of a rule ought to be determined by an objective
standard, based upon a textual analysis of the rule's scope and
substance.
The plea for an objective standard is grounded in an important
reality. Uninvolved third parties and citizens-at-large routinely may
have important reliance interests in the validity of agency action. Reliance interests often have accompanying monetary costs, and ought not
to be upset by uncertainty regarding whether the agency has described
fully all reasons for its otherwise validly chosen policy.
If the "reasons" requirement suggests that more substance of the
agency's policy choice can be reviewed, it appears to impose, sub silentio, an implied requirement that the agency must produce some factual
or policy predicates to justify its choice. Unfortunately, the dimensions
of those shadowy requirements are hopelessly unclear. They do not fit
easily into the quasi-legislative model of agency policy choice (it is axiomatic that legislators are never required to articulate the reasons for
policy choices they enact into statutes). Further, those implied "reasons" requirements advance a disquietingly activist, rather than deferential, posture for the reviewing court-or at least they leave this temptation open to creative advocacy. Repeated litigation would undoubtedly
be required to clarify the inevitably murky lines that separate "reasons" from the "facts," "arguments," or "assertions" which support
them.
48. This argument goes against the grain of much administrative law theory, and, indeed,
against criticism that the MSAPA itself does not go far enough. Rago, Rulemaking Under the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act: An Opportunity Missed, 34 ADMIN. L. REv. 445
(1982). The critics themselves are taken to task in Rosenblum, Book Review, 39 ADMIN. L. REV.
525 (1987) (reviewing A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING (1986)).
49. MSAPA (1981) § 5-116, 14 U.L.A. 151 (Supp. 1988).
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Second, the full force of the "comprehensive rationality" model of
decisionmaking is implicit in the "reasons" requirement. The rationaltechnical model here ignores the usual environment of state administrative decisionmaking. The typical state agency is not rich in staff depth.
The two commodities in shortest supply in the typical state agency are
likely to be political courage and executive time. The stock of each can
be rapidly depleted by the burdens of this requirement. Therefore, to
expect articulation in advance of all reasons justifying an action imposes a burden of time and delay not easily justified by the likely benefit of more complete articulation of every possible rationale of the
agency's policy.
Furthermore, the exercise of expert judgment-and that is often
the essence of a discretionary rulemaking policy choice-is often a mixture of experience, values and refined intuition. Considerations leading
to the act of policy judgment may not be as easily reducible to a set of
"reasons" as the 1981 MSAPA model assumes. 50 These problems are
compounded in circumstances typically encountered in state government. The agency decision genuinely may be collegial. Thousands of
multi-member citizen boards and commissions in the fifty states routinely exercise rulemaking responsibilities. They may do so after hearing or reviewing hundreds of considerations from the affected public
favoring or opposing a course of action. To expect the members of a
body to reduce their reasoning, or to psychoanalyze that of their colleagues, into a conclusively binding set of reasons, ignores group psychology, risks extension of the decisionmaking process indefinitely, and
maximizes the possibility that decisions will be based on the lowest
common policy denominator.
Third, the "reasons" requirement devalues the quasi-legislative
character of rulemaking generally. Unlike criminal law where courts
require police to specify their exact reasons for a search, the prevailing
rule is clearly otherwise for the outcomes of legislative action. In determining whether the legislature has acted within the scope of its plenary
authority, courts do not look to the considerations legislators overtly
advance; they accept those of which a rational person might plausibly
conceive. 51 No convincing reasons are given why the Model Act should
depart so markedly from this fundamental characteristic of the legislative model. 52
50. See generally Levin, supra note 7 at 281-82.
51. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 582 (1988).
52. Professor Bonfield has suggested to the author that the legislative analogy should not
apply because the administrative process is not politically accountable to the same degree as the
legislature. Three short responses should suffice: first, the agency rulemaking process itself only
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Finally, consider the likely institutional consequences of the "reasons" requirement imposed by MSAPA section 3-110(b). It almost assuredly provides full employment opportunity for government lawyers.
Apart from the expense and delay occasioned by the staff preparation
and legal analysis, it is not clear that the quality of agency decisionmaking would be improved. It may simply be that predecision rationalizations compiled by agency lawyers, rather than post hoc rationalizations advanced by appellate counsel, will mask the processes of decision.
This requirement, after all, simply infuses a new game of political anticipation. Agencies and their counsel will be tempted to advance the
most all-encompassing (and hence potentially uninformative) "reasons." They likely will state these reasons at the broadest level of generality lest they later be accused of overlooking specific considerations
which those vague but global reasons might subsume. The agency thus
has powerful incentives to give less information, albeit in general terms,
in order to better protect its own later options. State legislatures should
react with caution before adopting a provision which encourages such
behavior.

5.

Rulemaking in Utah: agency discretion preserved

The foregoing discussion will only be of academic interest in Utah
given the present direction of legislative policy respecting agency
rulemaking. Utah law imposes no requirement that rulemaking policy
choices must be justified by a statement of reasons in any form. The
Utah act even goes so far as to omit the language, almost universally
adopted from the 1961 model act, which requires an agency to "consider fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed
rule." 118 This omission was deliberate114 and was designed to help preclude judicial review of agency policy choice in the rulemaking process.
exists by virtue of direct delegation of authority to the agency from the politically accountable
legislatures. Second, the MSAPA abounds with procedural devices that reinforce political control
over the administrative process. Finally, the rulemaking result itself is subject to immediate legislative reversal, unlike the outcomes of agency adjudication which might claim immunity from
change by virtue of due process considerations.
53. RMSAPA (1961) § 3(a)(2), 14 U.L.A. 387 (1980). It is an open question whether or
how compliance with this provision might be judicially enforced. The author has found no reported case of any jurisdiction in which this requirement has been cited or discussed. Presumably
an agency's failure in good faith to consider public comments could be attacked under this directive
in a jurisdiction which retained the "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discretion" standard
for judicial review of rulemaking. Yet there still remains the threshold question how the factual
basis for the challenge might even be discovered or explored. See generally Frohnmayer, supra
note 9, at 468.
54. Personal conversation with William S. Callaghan, Ph.D., Director, Utah State Division
of Administrative Rules (Jan. 22, 1988).
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A more definitive form of deference to agency judgment is hard to
envision.
6.

"Reasons" in rulemaking: a middle course

The RMSAPA and the Utah Act each occupy a polar extreme
respecting the desirability of articulated agency reasons in the rulemaking process. Both formulations probably stem from differing underlying
models of the administrative process. The Model Act embodies an overt
"comprehensive rationality" approach, and the Utah Act is an almost
classical exemplar of deference to agency expertise. A middle course is
available which avoids the more obvious pitfalls of each extreme.
The middle course requires agency reasoning to be articulated at
the outset of the rulemaking process so that informed comments and
responses may be developed by the public; yet it avoids excessive entanglement in a substantive judicial process of rule review. The controls on
agency discretion are thorough requirements of procedural openness
and political oversight: modes of control best lending themselves to the
underlying quasi-legislative character of agency rulemaking. 1111

7.

Agency regulatory analysis: pitfalls to avoid

One final topic in the area of developing state rulemaking procedures deserves cautionary mention. Several jurisdictions have experimented with requiring agencies to develop "small business impact"
statements or other cost benefit studies as a precondition to agency
rulemaking. 116 In an optional provision, the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws for the 1981 Model Act propose section 3-105 117 relating to
required agency "regulatory analysis." The comment by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws overtly notes that the preparation of
such analysis is "burdensome," "hazardous" and potentially "subject to
great abuse. " 118
The cautionary language of the Commissioners is well taken. For
the bureaucratic complexities of analysis, language and technical expertise which such requirements quickly can produce, the reader need only
refer to federal agency paralysis engendered by this subject. 119 The jum55. These thoughts and the models of agency procedure to which they relate are more fully
developed in Frohnmayer, supra note 9, at 455-68.
56. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws§ 42-35 (1956); IDAHO Com§§ 67-5201 to 67-5218 (1980);
FLA. LAWS, § 120.54(2)(a) (1982).
57. 14 U.L.A. 92 (Supp. 1988).
58. Jd.
59. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1243 (1987).
See generally A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 212-25 (1986); Schwartz,
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ble of considerations confronting courts which seek to review agency
cost-benefit analyses should deter even the most adventurous.

C.

Trend 3: Courts Increasingly Impose Minimal Rulemaking
Requirements Beyond the Specification of Statutes

At the federal level, settled law has permitted administrative agencies to choose, within their discretion, whether to develop agency policy
by rulemaking or through case-by-case adjudication. 60 Despite critical
commentary in scholarly journals, 61 no obvious indication of a pending
change in direction is apparent.
Developments in some state jurisdictions reflect a trend contrary to
the federal approach. In Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 62 the Oregon Court of Appeals required a
liquor licensing agency to articulate rules in advance of licensing actions taken by the agency under a broad statutory mandate. The court
reasoned that only under an articulated-rule approach could meaningful standards be devised to govern the decision of contested cases under
the Oregon AP A.
The Sun Ray decision has not been adopted expressly by the Oregon Supreme Court, perhaps in part because the Oregon Administrative Procedure Act cannot be read clearly to require pre-enforcement
rulemaking. 63 However, the Oregon Supreme Court, and appellate
courts of other jurisdictions64 have reached similar conclusions.
In a trilogy of important cases-Trebesch v. Employment Division, Springfield Education Association v. Springfield School District
No. 19, and Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 6 ~>
the Oregon Supreme Court has attempted to define the criteria govThe Court and Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Administrative Law Idea Whose Time Has Come Or Gone?, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 291.
60. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974).
61. See, e.g., Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
62. 16 Or. App. 63, 517 P.2d 289 (1973). The opinion of Judge Tanzer still is one of the
single best appellate court sources articulating the values of agency rulemaking.
63. OR. REV. STAT.§ 183.355(5) (1971), expressly provides for the validity of general rules
arising from the disposition of contested cases.
64. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 478 A.2d 742
(1984); Anderson v. State, 135 Ariz. 578, 663 P.2d 570 (App. 1982). See generally Bonfield,
Mandating State Agency Lawmaking by Rule, 2 B.Y.U J. PuB. L. 161 (1988).
65. Trebesch v. Employment Div., 300 Or. 264, 710 P.2d 136 (1986); Springfield Educ.
Ass'n v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 290 Or. 217, 621 P.2d 547 (1980); Megdal v. Oregon
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980). This trilogy is discussed
briefly in Frohnmayer, Of Legislative Intent, the Perils of Legislative Abdication, and the
Growth of Administrative and judicial Power, 22 WILLAMETTE L. J. 219, 234-35 (1986).
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erning an agency's obligation to develop rules in advance of enforcement action (a "pre-enforcement rulemaking obligation"). The pre-enforcement rulemaking obligation in these decisions is treated as an
adjunct, not of a requirement internal to the state APA, but as an aspect of the law of delegated authority and of statutory construction. In
Megdal, the court held that the agency had an obligation to engage in
pre-enforcement rulemaking with respect to the term "unprofessional
conduct." The term was deemed by the court to be a shorthand delegation of power and as such required agency rules to refine specific standards before enforcement action could occur. 66 In Springfield, the
Court articulated refinements of this analysis which attempted to parse
types of statutory language into three categories. The characterization
of the language of statutory delegation was then said to dictate the extent of the agency's rulemaking obligation.
However, while paying homage to the Megdal I Springfield analysis, the court six years later in Trebesch cast doubt on whether the
agency's clarification of governing law must invariably be accomplished
by advance rulemaking. 67 The purported reasoning of Trebesch lies in
detailed analysis of the text and legislative history of each statutory
scheme at issue. 68 Whether statutes always give birth to clear answers
after such analysis is, of course, open to serious question.
The 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides
more specific guidance than the still-evolving state case law. Sections 2104(3) and 2-104(4) require an agency "as soon as feasible, and to the
extent practicable," to adopt rules articulating standards governing the
law it administers, and to adopt rules superseding principles declared
in particular adjudications. While the language of the 1981 act is susceptible to dispute concerning the meaning of what is "feasible" or
"practicable," the provisions are a potentially flexible and helpful uniform statutory clarification of evolving law at the state level.
D.

Trend 4: Constitutional and Statutory Developments Have
Expanded Dramatically Both the Nature and Substance of
Controversies Requiring the Use of Formal Adjudication Procedures
In federal administrative law, the number of agency actions subject
to formal adjudication procedure under the APA is severely limited.
66. For an excellent and thorough discussion of Megdal see generally Bonfield, supra note
64, at 184-92.
67. See Trebesch v. Employment Div., 300 Or. 264, 267-70, 710 P.2d 136, 137-40 (1986).
68. See also Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 300 Or. 507, 716 P.2d 724 (1986)
(construction of term "immorality" can be achieved either through prior rulemaking or reasoned
orders in contested cases).
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Not only is formal adjudication procedure in the federal act subject to a
number of exceptions,69 the adjudication provisions themselves are triggered only if a separate statute requires an agency hearing "on the
record. " 70

1.

Broad state statutory entitlements to an agency hearing

The case is to the contrary on the state level. Formal trial-type
procedures required in "on the record" hearings are likely to be far
more numerous in the states for several reasons. First, the conditions
giving rise to formal hearings usually are specified in self-contained
procedural statutes which are broader in scope than the federal APA.
The 1961 Model Act, for example, defines a "contested case" more
expansively than its federal counterpart defines an adjudication. 71
Second, no statutory mandate limits formal adjudications to those
where a statute provides for a hearing "on the record." State AP A provisions typically require an agency hearing when the hearing requirement stems from state statute or from a constitutional provision. 72
Third, some states require agency hearings in conditions extending well
beyond those of the Revised 1961 Model Act.
The Oregon APA, for example, creates a "contested case" in instances where the agency has "discretion to suspend or revoke the right
or privilege of a person." 73 This obviously expansionary language has
given rise to surprisingly few legal claims as to what might be characterized inventively as a "right" or "privilege." 74 In Morrison v. Oregon
Health Sciences University/ 5 the dismissal of a student from the school
of dentistry on the grounds of poor clinical performance was held to
give rise to a "contested case" under this provision. The result is of
interest because it goes well beyond any explicit command of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 76
A more subtle point relating to APA adjudicatory hearing require69. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(1)-(6) (1982).
70. Id. § 554(a).
71. RMSAPA (1961) § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 371 (1980).
72. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Douglass, 452 A.2d 329 (D.C. App. 1982); Dremel v.
State Nursing Home Review Bd., 119 Wis. 2d 75, 349 N.W.2d 725 (1984).
73. OR. REv. STAT. § 183.310(2)(a)(B) (1971).
74. The entitlement in question, for example, must be broader than one of constitutional
dimension, since no government has discretion to "suspend or revoke" a constitutional guarantee.
75. 68 Or. App. 870, 685 P.2d 439 (1984). See also Patton v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 293
Or. 363, 647 P.2d 931 (1982).
76. See, e.g., Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). However,
the Oregon Court of Appeals declined to require a contested case hearing where a faculty member
was reassigned but with no loss of salary, rank or privilege. Walker v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher
Educ., 66 Or. App. 448, 674 P.2d 88 (1984).
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ments deserves attention. In the confrontation between citizens and
their governments, the very existence of APA procedures alters the balance of power and shifts the agency's assertive posture to a more defensive one. If a hearing is due to a person entitled to a contested case, the
agency has the obligation to initiate the process. The agency must
frame the issues and give appropriate notice. The burden of assessing
the justification for agency action thus shifts from those adversely impacted by it to those in the agency who propose to undertake it initially.

2.

The "due process revolution"

The "due process revolution" 77 is far more responsible for the increase in scope and volume of state agency contested cases than is any
other specific statutory or judicial development. At the federal government and many local government levels, the procedural requirements
imposed by the due process clause to protect a particular "interest" are
variable according to the nature and weight of the controversy. 78 However, this appears not to be the case in many states. If the United States
Constitution requires a hearing at all, the normal procedures governing
conduct of contested cases in the state APA automatically apply in their
entirety. 79 The uncertainties of a flexible due process calculus are
avoided at the cost of requiring a high, and perhaps unduly expensive,
degree of statutorily required procedural formality.
77. The "revolution" was, for these purposes, largely established by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970). See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267
(1975); j. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985).
78. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) with Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976) and Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See generally
Friendly, supra note 77.
79. This result follows from a literal reading of the definition of "contested case" in § 1(2) of
the RMSAPA; the definition is triggered when "the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party
are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." RMSAPA
(1961) § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 371 (1980) (emphasis added). The due process clause is "law," and the
drafters of the RMSAPA omitted the reference to hearings required by "constitutional right"
because the phrase simply was unnecessary. 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 120
(1965).
The experience of several states may not, however, be as clear-cut as the definition seems to
command. There is continuing ambivalence in some jurisdictions as to whether state laws based on
the 1961 Model Act in fact embody the guarantee of an APA adjudicative hearing where constitutional due process is implicated. Letter to the author from Professor Harold Levinson (January
26, 1988). See generally Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 477 A.2d 119
(1984); Donnelly Ass'n v. District of Columbia Review Bd., 520 A.2d 270 (D.C. App. 1987); Bay
Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Dickinson, 229 So.2d 302 (Fla. App. 1969). See generally Bonfield,
The Definition of Formal Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 63
IowA L. REv. 285 (1977). The 1974 Florida Administrative Procedure Act specifically rejected
the conclusion of Bay National Bank that "quasi-executive" actions such as licensing were not
"contested cases." Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and
1975 Amendments, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 617, 628 (1975)
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The United States Supreme Court arguably broadened the reach
of due process protections believing the burdens might be tempered by
flexibility in prescribing procedures. 80 The tradeoff of flexibility is lost,
however, if contested case procedures always must be observed in their
entirety. 81 The concern is not a trivial one, because trivial fact situations may still require expensive complex proceedings. 82 This aU-ornothing approach to due process analysis clearly is the unintended consequence of tying a single adjudicatory procedure to any legally imposed hearing requirement.
The new MSAPA 83 and the UAPA 84 provide welcome, if as yet
untested, innovations to help resolve the quandary of adjudicatory overformalization. The Model Act provides a structured "formal adjudicative proceeding" (§ 4-201), a "conference adjudicative proceeding" (§
4-401 ), an "emergency adjudicative proceeding" ( § 4-501) and the
"summary adjudicative proceeding" (§ 4-502). 85 The latter three procedures are innovations which do much to adapt statutory decisionmaking
models to the realities of a broad variety of occasions where less rigorous agency procedures nonetheless fully protect citizens' rights as they
confront their governments.
The Utah act does not adopt all aspects of the less formal adjudicative procedures of the 1981 Model Act. 86 Nonetheless, it provides a
welcome and less rigid alteniative to be copied by jurisdictions which
now utilize the single-tier approach to agency adjudication.

E. Trend 5: The Power of a State Agency to Adjudicate
Constitutional Issues in Agency Litigation: Developments
Demonstrate Continuing Controversy
While growing recognition of an administrative agency's responsibility to rule on constitutional issues does not yet deserve the label of a
80. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
81. Only a few states have provided in the past for less than a formally structured adjudicatory proceeding. Maine permits limitation of issues or alteration of procedural requirements upon
agreement of the parties and the agency. Delaware, Florida, Montana and Virginia "describe at
least the rudiments of less-than-formal adjudication." MSAPA (1981) § 4-102, comment, 14
U.L.A.114-15 (Supp.1988).
82. See, e.g., O'Neil, Recalculating the Cost-Benefit Balance for Trial-Type Procedures, 38
ADMIN. L. REv. 141 (1986) (replaced faculty string quintet member invokes due process right to
contested case hearing).
83. MSAPA (1981) Art. IV, 14 U.L.A. 112 (Supp. 1988).
84. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 63-46b-3 (Supp. 1988).
85. See generally Levinson, An Introduction to the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, Part II: Adjudication, Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. 13,
14-21 (1982).
86. See supra note 84.
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developed trend, this important issue recently has received further judicial articulation. In Cooper v. Eugene School District No. 4-J, 87 the
Oregon Supreme Court held that a review agency not only was empowered, but had the affirmative duty to decide constitutional issues
arising from the revocation of a teacher's certificate for wearing religious garb in the classroom in violation of a state statute.
Utah 88 and a number of other jurisdictions89 deny an administrative agency the authority to rule upon constitutional questions. Utah
appellate courts may wish to revisit this issue in light of the new Utah
APA. The order of the presiding officer, under the new UAPA's judicial review provisions, almost axiomatically, is required to state "conclusions of law" 90 in a formal adjudicative proceeding. It is difficult at
first blush to see how considerations of constitutional law could be
omitted. Moreover, a reviewing court must grant relief if the agency
"has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution," 91 or has "erroneously interpreted or applied the law." 92 Most importantly, the reviewing court must grant relief when "the agency action, or the statute
or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its
face or as applied." 93 Each of these directives to the reviewing court
might easily be read to imply that the agency has an implicit duty in
the first instance to prevent the identified forms of agency error even
from reaching the court. In light of the imperatives of this language,
the reviewing court or the agency cannot acquiesce in the agency's failure to resolve a constitutional issue presented in the controversy at the
agency level.

F. Trend 6: judicial Insistence on Strict Compliance with the
Statutory Requirement of "Findings" in Agency Adjudicatory
Orders is Strict Construction and Much More
One of the most noticeable developments reflected in recent state
administrative jurisprudence is appellate court enforcement of statutory
requirements governing the content of agency orders. The almost universal requirement that adjudicatory orders must be accompanied by
"findings of fact" has received particular attention. Not only must the
87. 301 Or. 358, 723 P.2d 298 (1986), appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1597 (1987).
88. Shea v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (1941).
89. See generally Comment, When Constitutional Issues Arise in Agency Adjudications: A
Suggested Approach, 65 OR. L. REv. 413 (1986).
90. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-10(1)(b) (Supp. 1988).
91. /d. at § 63-46b-16(4)(c).
92. Id. at § 63-46b-16(4)(d).
93. /d. at§ 63-46b-16(4)(a).
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agency go beyond the mere parroting of statutory language, 94 but courts
also increasingly insist that the agency decision be accompanied by a
"reasoned explanation" of its findings and decisions. 95 The requirement
is obviously intended to assure a reasoned decision by the agency and to
facilitate meaningful judicial review thereafter. 96 A mere summary of
the evidence, even if comprehensive, will not suffice to meet the statutory requirement. 97 Beyond the literal "findings" requirements, some
courts now require articulation in some depth of the reasoning
processes through which the agency decisionmaker relates findings to
the conclusions. 98
Ordinarily, it would come as no surprise that reviewing courts insist on agency compliance with a clearly articulated statutory requirement. Two considerations, however, make mention of this requirement
necessary. First, given the volume of state administrative agency adjudications which occur each year, it would be astonishing if more than a
small handful of state agencies even now comply fully in every particular with the findings requirement prescribed by most statutes-at least
if explicit findings are required in the case of every remotely contested
issue of fact. Second, the degree to which reviewing courts overtly have
added additional considerations merits attention. Recent Oregon developments are instructive and may signify a further, more cautious judicial mid-course correction of tendencies to require exhaustive articulation of factual findings.
In Cascade Forest Products v. Accident Prevention Division, 99
the Oregon Court of Appeals held an agency contested case order insufficient because it did not list a concise statement of underlying facts
supporting the agency's findings as to each "contested issue of fact" and
as to each "ultimate fact." In addition, the Oregon Court of Appeals
94. Texas Health Facilities Comm'n v. Presbyterian Hosp., 690 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985).
95. See Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1979, 32 ADMIN. L. REv. 411, 430
(1980); Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1984, 37 ADMIN. L. REv. 133, 145-46
(1985). See also Voight v. Washington Island Ferry Line, Inc., 79 Wis. 2d 333, 255 N.W.2d 545
(1977).
96. Few decisions fully articulate why the reviewing court adopts either a stringent or a more
deferential posture respecting the findings requirement. Some such requirement seems essential to
make the already lenient "substantial evidence" standard even remotely meaningful at the agency
level. Without articulated findings of some specificity, it might not be discoverable whether the
agency has established the factual premises justifying its action.
97. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 253 S.E.2d 912 (1979); Novell v. Portland Area
LGBC, 43 Or. App. 849, 604 P.2d 896 (1979).
98. See, e.g., Home Plate, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 20 Or. App. 188, 530
P.2d 862 (1975) ("substantial reasons" requirement). The source of an obligation to explain conclusions at length is not readily apparent from the text of the typical APA. It may be questioned
whether this judicial gloss on statutory law is either justified or appropriate.
99. 60 Or. App. 255, 260, 653 P.2d 574, 577 (1982).
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recently has held that, where credibility determinations are important
to the decision of a case, the presiding officer or referee must make an
explicit finding as to the credibility of a claimant. 100 However, in Dennis v. Employment Division 101 and Hyde v. Employment Division/ 02
the Oregon Supreme Court now has cast doubt on the continuing validity of these holdings. In these later companion cases, the court concluded that the agency decisionmakers need not explain every finding of
fact based on conflicting evidence as long as the findings are supported
by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole.
The holdings in Dennis and Hyde are best explained as a judicial
accommodation between the statutory command of particularized findings, and the institutional imperatives of agencies required to decide
volumes of cases in an effort to accomplish mass justice. This newly
refined balance is welcome. At some point, the imperatives of timeliness, finality and economy in decisionmaking simply outweigh a theoretical desire to make every agency decision a model of exhaustively
articulated administrative specificity. Increased specificity will not deter
the administrator whose objective is to visit injustice on the innocent.
On the other hand, the potential for delay, innocent mistake and procedural confusion can be increased substantially if exhaustive findings
must be marshalled for every sub-step of the agency reasoning process.
Notwithstanding these judicial efforts to balance statutory dictates
against institutional imperatives, the central requirement of articulated
factual conclusions remains clear and eminently sound. The exclusivity
of the record and the intelligibility of the ultimate agency decision are
at the heart of the fairness of an administrative hearing. 103 Those considerations generated a potentially far-reaching precedent on another
issue in an Oregon case just discussed. In Dennis v. Employment Division, both the court of appeals 104 and the Oregon Supreme Court 106
concluded that the agency hearings officer has an affirmative duty to
develop the record for decision. The obligation applies even if the as100. See Derochier v. Employment Div., 70 Or. App. 521, 690 P.2d 519 (1984); Ashmore v.
Employment Div., 70 Or. App. 516, 690 P.2d 522 (1984).
101. 302 Or. 160, 728 P.2d 12 (1986) (agency denial of unemployment benefits).
102. 302 Or. 171, 728 P.2d 19 (1986) (agency disqualification of claimant seeking unemployment benefits).
103. These considerations distinguish the role of the judicial "hard look" in adjudicatory
hearings from the more deferential posture earlier advanced respecting judicial review of administrative rulemaking. The underlying constitutional basis of the distinction, which has its roots in
considerations of personal liberty, was articulated as early as the famous couplet of Londoner v.
City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) and Bi-Metallic lnv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
104. 77 Or. App. 633, 713 P.2d 1079 (1986).
105. 302 Or. 160, 728 P.2d 12 (1986).
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signment means assisting the claimant. The court concluded that such
assistance does not convert the hearings officer into an advocate. This
responsibility, rather, is an accompaniment of the duty to conduct a full
and fair inquiry into matters relevant to the inquiry. This court-imposed requirement was in the process of statutory codification during
the pendency of the litigation. 106 Therefore, the degree to which the
Oregon Supreme Court would agree with the Court of Appeals that
this extraordinarily activist consideration was grounded on purported
Fourteenth Amendment considerations was effectively mooted.

G.

Trend 7: Continuing Confusion Exists over the Availability,
Scope and Standards Governing judicial Review

This trend would deserve comprehensive analysis but for the pioneering work of several scholars. A decade ago, Professor Donald Brodie and Justice Hans Linde masterfully chronicled the confusion rampant in existing judicial decisions and statutory standards governing
appellate review of state agency adjudications. 107 There is little new to
add.
A cursory review of cases decided under variants of the 1961
MSAPA demonstrates that state courts continue to manipulate conclusory epithets such as "arbitrary and capricious," "clearly erroneous," "substantial evidence" and "abuse of discretion" to achieve a bewildering and often contradictory array of outcomes, without furthering
the cause of judicial predictability in the process. Moreover, the standards themselves are often confused with, or even melded into each
other. 108 Brodie and Linde cautioned against the use of such terms:
Existing statutory and judicial formulations for reviewing the exercise of discretion are among the most unsatisfactory in the area of
judicial review of agency action. Words such as "arbitrary," "capri106. See OR. REv. STAT.§ 183.415(10) (1983).
107. Brodie & Linde, State Court Review of Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope of
Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537 (1977). A useful project of similar ambition recently has sought
to bring much needed clarity to federal law in this area. See generally Levin, Scope-ofReview
Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 239 (1986).
108. See, e.g., Chavez v. Comm'n, 98 N.M. 462, 649 P.2d 1375 (1982) ("substantial evidence" defined in terms of "legal residuum" rule); Billings v. Billings Firefighters, 200 Mont.
421, 651 P.2d 627 (1982) ("substantial evidence" equivalent to review under "clearly erroneous"
standard); (accord Gulick v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 452 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1982); In re Muzzy,
141 Vt. 463, 449 A.2d 970 (1982) (difference between "substantial evidence" and broader "clearly
erroneous" standards, though distinction "more semantic than substantive"); McClure v. Iowa
Real Estate Comm'n, 356 N.W.2d 594 (1984) ("unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious" standard
incorporates "abuse of discretion" standard); Adelman v. Bahou, 85 A.D.2d 862, 446 N.Y.S.2d
500 (App. Div. 1981) ("substantial evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" tests apply "rationality" standard).
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cious," or "abuse of discretion," state conclusions, not premises from
which a conclusion may be derived. When a statute or a line of precedents instructs a reviewing court to set aside action found to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, it merely provides the
terms in which the conclusion of invalidity may be pronounced. These
terms do nothing to articulate the process of analysis by which the
issue of invalidity is to be litigated and decided. Indeed, the presence
of these conclusory epithets in statutes or case law as grounds for reversal is deceptive insofar as they appear to sanction review and reversal of governmental action on the basis of the judge's reaction to
the particular circumstances before him, without any need for premises more searching than the stigmatizing phrases themselves. 109

In light of this criticism, two concerns respecting the judicial review
provisions of the new UAPA begin to emerge. The UAPA uses old
model act language that is arguably surplusage, and dangerous surplusage at that. It also provides for a two-track system of judicial review
that, unless monitored carefully, might magnify the dangers of the
broad standards. Let us examine these concerns in turn.

1.

Linguistic surplusage

The 1981 MSAPA includes an optional provisiOn perm1ttmg a
court to find an action "otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious" as a ground for invalidity of an agency action. 110 The Utah act
expressly adopted this language, omitting only the epithet "unreasonable."111 The Utah act also departs in a minor but potentially important
manner from the Model Act by allowing invalidation of an action
which is an "abuse of discretion." 112
It may be that settled judicial decisions construing "abuse of discretion" and the "arbitrary and capricious" standard under prior law
give greater comfort to Utah courts and litigants than would be the case
of new criteria woven from whole cloth. This conclusion probably is
109. Brodie & Linde, supra note 107, at 550.
110. MSAPA (1981) § 5-116(c)(8)(iv), 14 U.L.A. 151 (Supp. 1988).
111. UTAH Com: ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) (Supp. 1988). Professor Harold Levinson suggested at the Western States Seminar on State and Local Administrative Law in Salt Lake City, in
January 22, 1988, that the retention by Utah of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard may
simply have been the product of drafters' oversight. Levinson, a co-author of the 1981 MSAPA,
recounted that the standard was retained in the MSAPA primarily to apply to judicial review of
rulemaking. Yet all MSAPA rulemaking provisions were omitted from the Utah Act. Since the
judicial review provisions cover all aspects of administrative procedure, retention of the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard may, in part, have been an innocent mistake.
112. UTAH Coot: ANN.§ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (Supp. 1988). The Model Act uses the more
limited, or at least arguably clearer language "outside the range of discretion delegated to the
agency by any provision of law." MSAPA (1981) § 5-116(c)(8)(i), 14 U.L.A. 151 (Supp. 1988).
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suspect for three reasons.
First, a list of exhaustive and specific standards governing judicial
review immediately precedes this catch-all standard in the UAPA. It is
difficult to envision a defect in agency action that is not otherwise effectively identified. 113 Those standards serve to invalidate action that is
unconstitutional, beyond agency jurisdiction, incomplete, legally erroneous, unlawful in its procedure, taken by an improper decisionmaker,
made without adequate evidence, made contrary to rule, or decided contrary to past agency practice. 114 The list of methods to attack potential
administrative atrocities seems exhaustive on its face.
Second, but related, the mere inclusion of these additional labels
suggests that they refer to some characteristic of agency action not subsumed by the other criteria, complete as those criteria seem. This perception will serve to elevate the power-though certainly not the predictability-of reviewing courts. The UAPA drafters may well have
intended the UAPA as an ultimate broad judicial check on agency action; but, this authority may unintentionally confer upon the courts a
free-floating censorial power which is as standardless as the UAPA
otherwise prohibits the actions of agencies to be.
Finally, the phrases "abuse of discretion" and "arbitrary and capricious," unless construed narrowly, are almost certain to contribute
unnecessarily to judicial workload. Litigants who fail to find other statutory bases available may attempt increasingly to import these traditionally baffling common law concepts into statutes when the statutes
were designed in major respects to render those concepts obsolete. The
benefits of decisive and well-reasoned administrative expertise may be
lost if some degree of deference is not given to an agency process not
otherwise assailable under the new standards set forth in the UAPA. In
short, if these tired phrases are not repealed altogether they should, at
113. Oregon Supreme Court Justice Michael Gillette suggested at the Western States Seminar on State and Local Administrative Law on January 21, 1988, the following hypothetical
potentially justifying an "abuse of discretion" standard: Suppose an environmental enforcement
agency is delegated authority to fine polluters between $200 and $10,000. A corporation thereafter
is assessed the full $10,000 civil penalty for a trivial infraction. Is not the action only challengeable
under an "abuse of discretion" standard?
My response is three-fold. First, if the agency action is within the range of delegated discretion, the quarrel should be with the legislature for irresponsible abdication of authority, not with
the agency for acting within legally cunferred limits. Second, there exist powerful political controls
elsewhere in the MSAPA and the UAPA to provide checks on such agency misbehavior through
public hearings and legislative and executive review of rules. Finally, unless this were the very
first enforcement action taken by the agency, the corporation could rlaim judicial redress by showing that the action is "contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency .
. . ."UTAH Com: ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) (Supp. 1988).
114. UTAH Com: ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(a-h) (Supp. 1988).
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best, be regarded as surplusage or only as catch-all residue to be relied
upon only in the most extreme case of agency lawlessness.

2.

Two-tier judicial review

A well-intentioned outsider might advance a second concern related to the prospects of the two-tiered system of judicial review under
the Utah act.IU~ Under the new law, formal adjudicative proceedings
are reviewed by the Supreme Court, or other appellate courts designated by statute.U 6 However, informal adjudicative proceedings are reviewable in district courts. The review is de novo whether or not there
is a record of the proceedings.U 7
There is no serious quarrel with the appropriateness of de novo
review of an agency action not based on a record. However, choosing to
have trial court review of adjudications, formal or informal, where
there is a developed record, presents a more serious set of concerns.
First, such review may initially inhibit the growth of a developed
body of consistent law respecting such adjudications. A unified appellate court develops such law by necessity; the many different local jurisdictions may instead simply balkanize the development of administrative law doctrine for no reason other than the potentially large numbers
of jurisdictions available as forums. The same agency may be subject to
the different law of different counties depending on the choice of district court forum.
Second, if litigants are in doubt respecting what adjudicative process they have undergone, or should have undergone, (formal adjudicative proceedings or informal adjudicative proceedings) they may file for
review at the wrong appellate level. The possibility of such wasteful
accidents is both real and unfair. A multi-tiered system of judicial review encourages such expensive risks.
Third, trial and appellate courts generally apply different standards respecting the formalities of the law of evidence. The UAPA retains the "legal residuum" rule. 118 Yet under the MSAPA, the generally permissible uses of hearsay evidence in administrative proceedings
are far broader than otherwise would be permissible in the trial of civil
115. The author is deeply indebted to Professor Harold Levinson for his initial exploration
of these considerations at the Western States Seminar on State and Local Administrative Law. See
supra note 111.
116. UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 63-46b-16(1) (Supp. 1988).
117. UTAH Com: ANN.§ 63-46b-15(1)(a) (Supp. 1988).
118. Under the legal residuum rule, administrative findings must be supported by some evidence that would be admissible in judicial proceedings, even if the agency's authority to receive
evidence is not limited by traditional evidentiary rules. See K.C. DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 239 (2nd. ed. 1980).
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actions. Restricting administrative proceedings to the standards of Utah
Rules of Evidence on judicial review 119 may further inhibit the utilization of the administrative process to its fullest potential in seeking informal resolution of disputes.
Fourth, the existence of alternative forums for review may introduce undesirable elements. Litigants or agencies may engage in forum
shopping or, even worse, may play gamesmanship as to the very choice
of their adjudicative process with one eye securely on the appellate forum most likely to favor them.
Finally, as is well established, there are important differences in
the very environments occupied respectively by trial and appellate
courts. Trial judges may find it hard to discard their otherwise entirely
appropriate judicial habits when faced with the sometimes foreign administrative law concepts of deference to agency discretion, the role of
agency expertise, the doctrine of official notice and other legal constructs designed to strike an appropriate balance between executive and
judicial branch responsibilities in the development of public law.
CoNCLUSION

Notwithstanding the concerns just expressed, the Utah act has
great promise of enabling the development of the legal certainty and
clarity its framers have promised. But on the horizon of a more distant
future lies an even more ambitious undertaking which Utah and other
path-breaking jurisdictions may yet contemplate. 120
This Utah statute speaks to judicial review of agency adjudicatory
action. Unlike the Model Act, it does not purport to cover review of
agency rulemaking, nor is it designed to encompass in a unified manner
the other types of legal remedy for administrative agency action which
developed at common law. Finally, it is limited to actions taken by state
agencies, not those of local governments.
The next generation of innovation in judicial review is poised to
explore a unified approach to this challenge. A unified judicial review
statute has both promise and pitfalls. It greatly simplifies the procedural quagmire created by old common law writs and remedies. It must
be drafted so that defenses immunities and procedural requirements
which presently guard the ambit of legitimate and needed government
discretion can be preserved. The task of accommodation will not be
easy. Yet, with the experience of its recently enacted and pioneering
119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-15(3)(b) (Supp. 1988).
120. See generally Safriet, judicial Review of Govemment Action: Procedural Quandaries
and a Plea for Legislative Reform, 15 ENVTL. L. REv. 217 (1985).
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reforms, Utah is ably equipped to help lead this new thrust.
The Utah experience is in broad accord with the state administrative law trends identified in this article. The relative youth of Utah
administrative law is not a curse; if anything, it is a benefit. Common
law principles respecting administrative procedure have not become encrusted by decades of judicial gloss. Instead, drawing on the best national models available, Utah can implement a modern statutory
scheme which is both the product of innovation and the opportunity for
further pioneering efforts in public law reform.

